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Introduction 
Understood as a watershed moment (Becker, Fetzer and Novy, 2017; Hozić and True, 2017), 
few events have divided and shocked the nation on the same level as ‘Brexit’. It seems that 
the pollsters, academics, self-styled ‘experts’, and much of the political elite and mainstream 
media grossly misread the mood of the British public in the build up to the Referendum. The 
British electorate took to the polls on the 23 June 2016 and voted 51.9% in favour of leaving 
the EU. Since the result, researchers (as well as commentators and politicians) have grappled 
to understand the outcome. Much of this research has sought to understand who voted Leave, 
often by engaging in quantitative analyses of voter demographics, and suggests that the 
outcome was mediated by a range of (intersecting) factors, including: income, education, age, 
political (dis)engagement, (un)employment, and housing (Becker et al., 2017; Goodwin and 
Heath, 2016; Swales, 2016). The early popular commentary tended to construct Leave voters 
as less educated and of lower income than their Remain counterparts, and motivated to vote 
Leave by feeling ‘left behind’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Swales, 2016). Yet 
claims that ‘Brexit’ represents a backlash by the (white) working-class do not hold up to 
scrutiny (Bhambra, 2017; Dorling, 2016; Rajan-Rankin, 2017). Not only were the middle 
classes more likely to vote Leave than the working-classes (Dorling, 2016) but the focus that 
scholarship has given to the ‘legitimate’ claims of the narrowly-defined white working-class 
operates to legitimise ‘analyses that might otherwise have been regarded as racist’ (Bhambra, 
2017: 214). Whilst there is a growing body of scholarship which centralises the racism, 
nationalism and post-colonialism underpinning the vote (Bhambra, 2017; Burnett, 2017; 
Rajan-Rankin, 2017; Virdee and McGeever, 2018; Wilson, 2016), there has been less 
consideration given to the subtle, subterranean and seemingly non-racial – or ‘post racial’ 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Goldberg, 2015) – ways racisms are articulated in the accounts of Leave 
voters.  
 
Given that there has been even less scholarly attention directed at localised research, this 
article reports on a project which focused on the Greater Manchester city of Salford. This is a 
city that saw 56.8% of the electorate vote in favour of leaving the EU, a figure significantly 
greater than the national average of 51.9%. The Leave vote in Salford has been presented by 
some as contributing to a negative perception of the city (Cowburn, 2016), which has over 
recent years endured stigma, in no small part due to its long-standing association with so-
called ‘gang’ crime and the notoriety of the 2011 ‘Salford riots’. Drawing upon data generated 
– as part of a broader mixed-methods project – through 13 semi-structured interviews, this 
article centralises the voices of Leave voters in Salford. In so doing, it examines the ways in 
which our interviewees couched their xeno-racist views in seemingly non-racial ways – that is 
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to say, the ways in which they employed economic arguments and emphasised their proximity 
to racially minoritised and/or migrating people to mitigate their racism.    
 
We begin by offering an overview of existing research that seeks to understand ‘Brexit’, before 
laying out the theoretical framings for this article by bringing into conversation bodies of 
scholarship on the ‘post-racial’ and ‘new racisms’. We then introduce the research project from 
which the data presented in this article derives, before offering our analysis of this data. In our 
analysis, we first explore the key motivators behind our interviewees’ votes, before examining 
how Salford Leave voters sought to distance themselves from accusations of racism, framed 
whiteness as victimised, and minimised their white privilege. Ultimately, we argue that under 
the cloak of the ’post-racial’, racisms may no longer be explicit but instead, assume new 
modes of articulation and emerge from the shadows at key moments, such the EU 
Referendum.  
 
Voting to leave the EU 
As Curtice (2017) observes, the British public never fully embraced its membership to the EU 
as determined through the 1975 Referendum. Unlike other EU nations, very few British 
citizens developed a strong European identity (Swami, Barron Weis and Furnham, 2018) and 
instead, a Euroscepticism has simmered below the surface for some time. Whilst this 
Euroscepticism is in part based upon a perception that the UK receives little socio-economic 
benefit from being an EU-member state, it is also clear that domestic politics greatly influenced 
the Leave vote, with early analyses focusing on Leave voters disenfranchisement from a 
liberal elite government (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Wright and Case, 2016). Some analyses 
of the individual and area-level drivers of the Referendum suggest that those voting Leave 
were typically: older in age; from a white ethnic background; with no formal educational 
qualifications or whose highest qualification was at CSE or O-level; with a monthly income of 
less than £1,200; and living in social housing (Becker et al., 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; 
Swales, 2016). Thus, the narrative that has gained political traction is one that constructs 
Leave voters as belonging to social groups that feel ‘left behind’ or, as McKenzie (2017) 
prefers to say, ‘left out’ - that is, those that have in the last 30 years suffered comparative 
economic, social and cultural impoverishment. However, the ‘left behind’ motif is a contested 
one. Indeed, whilst the white working-class have been positioned in the public imagination as 
driving the Leave vote, Dorling’s (2016) comprehensive analysis demonstrates that it was in 
fact the middle-classes who were more likely to vote Leave. As Antonucci et al., (2017) 
contend, in recent years the so-called ‘squeezed middle’ have perceived their socio-economic 
positions to be in decline because of economic changes resulting from globalisation. The 
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Leave campaign, therefore, managed to ‘successfully cohere a significant cross-class 
coalition’ of voters (Virdee and McGreever, 2018: 1803).  
 
Other scholars have focused less on the socio-economic motivators of the ‘Brexit’ vote and 
instead, examine how concerns around national identity and immigration were harnessed by 
those campaigning to leave the EU. This research draws attention to how the (broadly-defined) 
Leave campaign drew markedly on anxieties about immigration, multiculturalism, border 
control and security, by promising a regaining of sovereignty and a reassertion of a distinct 
English and/or British identity (Hobolt, 2016; Hobolt and Wratil, 2016; Wilson, 2016). As Virdee 
and McGeever (2018: 1802) note, an ‘insular, Powellite narrative of island retreat’ and ‘imperial 
longing to restore Britain’s place in the world as primus inter pares’ featured heavily in the 
Leave campaign. Thus, central to the Leave vote was an erasure both of the histories of racism 
underpinning Empire and its racialised legacies. This was evident in the Leave campaign’s 
activation of racialised structures, and associated anxieties about immigration and national 
belonging, which spoke not only to those who were struggling to cope with the loss of Empire 
but for whom the rallying calls to ‘take back control’ served to offer hope of Britain regaining 
global standing and authoritative rule (Virdee and McGeever, 2018: 1804). In this sense, the 
Leave campaign positioned itself as the last bastion of ‘authentic’ Britishness.  
 
For some Leave voters, British order and stability were therefore found to be more important 
principles than global freedom and diversity, and accordingly they support policies which 
favour restrictions on the free movement of people (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). Portes 
(2016: 14), for example, notes that negative attitudes toward immigration were ‘by far the 
strongest predicator of opposition to UK membership’ to the EU. For Kauffman (2017:10), the 
white majority population in the UK ought not to be stigmatised for wishing to express their 
racial, cultural and economic self-interests, and thus ‘do not deserve the “racist” appellation’. 
Yet Bhambra (2017), in her scathing critique of narrowly-conceived class-based analyses of 
‘Brexit’, foregrounds the racialised narratives underpinning the Leave vote. As she asserts, a 
narrow focus on class – which although not a neutral category, is ubiquitous in so-called ‘left 
behind’ arguments – displaces ‘racialized inequalities from the conversation’ (Bhambra: 2017: 
218). Thus, whilst due attention has been paid to the racialised narratives underpinning the 
Referendum, less attention has been paid to the subtle and seemingly non-racial – or ‘post-
racial’ – narratives that underpin the Leave vote. It is to an overview of the literature on the 
‘post-racial’ that this article now turns. 
 
New racisms in a ‘post-racial’ society 
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‘Post-racial’ logic holds that race bears little significance in liberal democracies, with the 
reported decline in explicit racist prejudices (see for example, Ford, 2008) held up as evidence 
that Western societies have moved beyond their racist pasts. The presence of Black, Asian, 
and minority ethnic (BAME) people in positions of power is ubiquitously constructed as 
symbolic of racial equity: for example, see Jonah Goldberg’s (2009) editorial on Barack 
Obama’s Presidential election and Douglas Murray’s (2018) piece in The Spectator, which 
used Meghan Markle’s marriage into the Royal family to position racism in Britain as a ‘myth.’ 
With explicit manifestations of racism now ‘rejected, rendered implicit, silenced or denied’ 
(Goldberg, 2015: 78), the ‘post-racial’ illusion works to repudiate the structural conditions of 
race (Joseph-Salisbury, 2018a) and limits racism to ‘individual acts of bigotry’ (Hodges, 
2016:1). The ascription of culpability at the level of the (‘bad’) individual is, as Valluvan (2016: 
2241) notes, consistent with the preferred modus operandi of contemporary neoliberalism. 
Racisms have thus not disappeared but rather, have assumed new models of articulation 
(Goldberg, 2008). They are ‘no longer overt, [but] seem almost invisible and are seemingly 
nonracial’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2015: 1363). Racisms remain deeply embedded within – and 
protected by – the economic, social and political structures of white supremacist societies. 
 
Although Bonilla-Silva (2015) contends that contemporary racism persists concomitant to a 
hegemonic refusal to acknowledge being a racist – ‘racism without racists’ – Goldberg (2008) 
argues that there are in fact ‘racisms without racism’. In making this distinction, Goldberg 
(2008: 1714) suggests that traditional racism has not disappeared but rather racisms have 
proliferated, in kind and quantity. Yet, ‘torn as they are from the classic conditions of racist 
articulation’, they become no longer recognisable (or ‘unseen’) in a contemporary epoch. 
Whilst contemporary racisms may be as difficult to recognise as they are to redress, Valluvan 
(2016: 2244) draws attention to the ‘remade terms by which race does indeed get named’. In 
this sense, literatures on ‘new racism(s)’ (Fekete, 2001; Kundnani, 2001; Sivanadan 2006) 
can be usefully brought into conversation with ‘post-racial’ theorising to examine how culture 
has become central to the continued practice of racist ideology (Patel, 2017). New racisms 
refer to emergent forms of discrimination that have replaced older, biologically-based racism. 
Still racist in origin and impact, new racisms essentialise culture by ‘othering’ racially 
minoritised people without using overtly racist language and whilst seemingly fulfilling equality 
measures (Pon, 2009: 60-61). Contemporary examples of such new racisms include 
Islamophobia and anti-‘migrant’ hostility, which draw upon older anxieties about identity, ‘race’, 
place and citizenship. These forms of hostility are often passed off in public and political 
discourse as legitimate, emerging from a ‘(natural) fear of strangers’ – a xenophobia – which 
operates to reify whiteness and nativism. More recently, xenophobia has been re-framed as 
‘xeno-racism’ because, as Sivanandan (2006: 2) notes, xenophobia ‘bears all the marks of old 
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racism’, except that the term fails to acknowledge its colour-coded aspect. It is ‘racism in 
substance, though xeno in form’ (Sivanandan, 2006: 2), meaning that newer forms of racism 
are permitted to present themselves as rooted in seemingly non-racial discourses of cultural 
preservation and nationalism (Pon, 2009).  
 
Within this ‘post-racial’ epoch, rhetoric, policy and practice that advocates for the foreclosing 
of borders to certain populations has prospered at a national, European and international level 
(Kundnani, 2001: 43). This control of movement is not exerted equally but rather, is highly-
stratified in nature, creating a situation in which some migrants (‘expats’) are celebrated, whilst 
others are feared (Andersson, 2014). In this sense, contemporary neoliberalism has drawn 
upon a politics of disgust to exclude – and to justify the exclusion of – certain social groups 
(Tyler, 2013) and to reinforce boundaries between ‘the self’ (the citizen) and the ‘contaminated 
other’ (the alien) (Ngai, 2005). In recent decades, the construction of ‘asylum seekers' as a 
suspect group – imagined in the public consciousness as bogus, deviant and/or criminal – 
functions to popularise resentment and fuels prejudice (Fekete, 2001; Kundanani, 2001). Yet 
in a ‘post-racial’ context, concerns around immigration are reframed as legitimate and 
seemingly non-racial (Patel, 2013; 2017). The anti-immigration attitudes of the public thus both 
feeds, and are fed by, a barrage of punitive legislation which seeks to control Western state 
borders. In the UK, the racist underpinnings of how borders close (in) on racially minoritised 
bodies have a long history but recently, the ‘Windrush’ scandal in 2018 cast light on the 
injustices of the Government’s ‘hostile environment’ agenda. Xeno-racist logic was also a 
dominant feature of some of the campaign materials in the lead up to the EU Referendum. 
The UK Independence Party’s campaign material for ‘Brexit’, for example, included a poster 
headlined ‘Breaking Point’, which depicted a line of refugees purportedly trying to reach 
Europe: imagery that is strikingly reminiscent of Nazi propaganda. Before moving on to explore 
how ‘post-racial’ racisms manifested in our interviews, we now briefly introduce you to the 
research aims and methods. 
 
The Salford ‘Brexit’ research project 
The qualitative data upon which this article draws derives from a broader mixed-method 
project exploring the Leave vote in Salford, which was undertaken between May 2017 and 
May 2018. The aims of this project were: (1) to explore the meanings and motivations 
residents in Salford ascribed to their vote to leave the EU; and (2) to examine whether Salford 
Leave voters perceived their pre-vote expectations to correspond with their immediate post-
vote views and experiences. Participants were included if they were a Salford resident the day 
of the EU Referendum and voted Leave. In part, the Greater Manchester city of Salford was 
selected on the basis that it saw a higher percentage of the electorate (56.8%) vote to leave 
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the EU than the national average (51.9%). Furthermore, the demographic makeup of Salford 
– for example, higher rates of low-skilled occupations, higher unemployment, and poorer 
health than the national average – enabled us to interrogate the utility of the dominant (‘left 
behind’) discourse found in previous scholarly work on ‘Brexit’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; 
Hobolt, 2016; McKenzie, 2017; Swales, 2016).  
 
Although an online survey of 114 Salford Leave voters was first used to generate data, it is 
data from the semi-structured interviews later carried out with 13 Leave voters that are centred 
in this article. The in-depth nature of these interviews yielded rich and detailed insights; 
although, the relatively small sample size does inevitably limit our ability to generalise our 
findings to all Leave voters. However, drawing upon Critical Race theoretical traditions, our 
intention is not to generalise findings beyond the sample but rather, to offer a counter-narrative 
to the hegemonic class-centric (‘left behind’) discourse, by exploring how ‘post-racial’ 
theorising can aid understandings of ‘Brexit’. Interviewees were recruited via social media, the 
Mobile Research Laboratoryi, and/or predominantly through the online survey, where 
respondents were asked to provide contact details if they were willing to be interviewed. The 
one-to-one interviews were conducted either face-to-face or over the phone, depending upon 
the interviewee’s preference, and lasted on average 45 minutes. Given the political 
sensitivities of ‘Brexit’ and the involvement of members of the population who were at the time 
demonised, in some quarters, for contributing to a rise in explicit racial hate crime, the study 
underwent an extensive and thorough ethical review.   
 
Given that interviewees volunteered to participate after first completing the online survey, the 
interview sample was essentially self-selecting. All 13 interviewees self-identified as ‘white’: 
either ‘white English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish/British) (n = 12) or ‘white Irish’ (n = 1). This 
is perhaps unsurprising given that the clear majority of survey respondents self-identified as 
white (n = 102; 89.5%), with only two respondents identifying as Mixed Asian and White 
(1.8%), one as Black Caribbean (0.9%), one and Asian Pakistani (0.9%) and eight choosing 
not to answer the question about ethnicity (7.0%). Yet it should be noted that although the 
national Leave vote appeared to be influenced by ethnic identity, it was not entirely ethnically 
marked. Indeed, the British Election Study indicates that 29% of Black adults and 32% of Asian 
adults voted Leave, compared to 51% of white adults (Swales, 2016: 27). It is important to 
recognise that anti-immigration sentiments are not unique to white people but rather, nativist 
attitudes influenced BAME Leave voters, who expressed resentment at the apparent ease 
with which European migrants can enter and work in the UK (Begum, 2018). Although 
interviewees were not asked directly about their social class, survey responses to questions 
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around educational qualifications, employment status and household income indicate that 
approximately half of our interviews were working-class and the other half lower-middle class.  
 
It is worth noting that from the outset, our names, institution and contact details were provided 
on all material relating to the project, with our photographs included on some recruitment 
materials. This information, along with the possibility that participants may have carried out 
internet searches to look at our academic profiles, would not only indicate that one of us (Patel) 
is British South Asian (Indian) and the other (Connelly) white British but that our work centres 
on anti-discrimination (‘race’/ethnicity and gender). Although it is impossible to measure the 
precise impact of our ‘racial’/ethnic markers – or our gender and/or academic work, it would 
also be reasonable to suspect that some interviewees modified or underplayed negative 
sentiments about ‘race’/ethnicity and immigration in the presence of Patel, in order to present 
themselves in more ‘favourable’ ways. That said, two interviewees (one interviewed by Patel 
and the other by Connelly) expressed, in some depth, views that appeared consistent with far-
Right ideology. Given that these views were also expressed in pre-interview communication, 
telephone interviews were carried out as a security precaution. 
 
In general, the semi-structured interviews explored: experiences of living in Salford; general 
voting attitudes and practices; motivations for voting Leave; the sources that informed their 
vote; post-Referendum experiences; hopes and fears for the ‘Brexit’ process; and their 
opinions on the Government’s handling of ‘Brexit’. All interviews were transcribed verbatim 
and analysed thematically, with the assistance of NVivo 10 Software. This involved an iterative 
process of manual coding by both researchers, first to pick out general themes and then with 
a focus on ‘post-racial’ racisms. We now explore some key findings: first by considering the 
key motivations behind the Leave vote, and then how Leave voters sought to distance 
themselves from accusations of racism, framed their whiteness as victimised, and attempted 
to minimise their white privilege. 
 
Findings and discussion 
A mixed-bag: Motivations for the Salford Leave vote 
Most interviewees were keen to emphasise that rather than there being one dominant 
motivator, there were several interconnecting reasons for their Leave vote. There were, as 
Johnii noted, ‘lots of little reasons’ behind the vote. Yet interviewees largely suggested that 
concerns around immigration were the primary motivator. Susan, for example, said that she  
…voted leave, on the simple basic grounds of, and I shouldn't actually say, I'm 
trying not to sound racist because that's the wrong thing to say. I voted leave 
primarily because of uncontrolled immigration. I don't believe in uncontrolled 
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immigration, certainly not at this moment in time. I don't believe in it in terms of 
from within the EU. I certainly don't believe in it from outside the EU.  
Cognizant of the way in which her reflections might be interpreted as racist, Susan 
acknowledges that her views might be ‘the wrong thing to say.’ In so doing, she demonstrates 
an awareness that explicitly prejudicial views are no longer palatable in a ‘post-racial’ society 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2015). That she is ‘trying not to sound racist’ is indicative of the broader shift in 
racism’s modes of articulation in recent years, from explicit ‘old’ forms to subtler and seemingly 
non-racial racisms (Goldberg, 2015). It is interesting that Susan is more concerned with not 
sounding racist than of not being racist.  
 
Evident in Susan’s account of her motivations for voting Leave was a concern with what she 
terms ‘uncontrolled immigration’, a notion common both in our interviews and in the analyses 
of other researchers (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Portes, 2016). It 
is clear that for many interviewees, ‘uncontrolled immigration’ was understood as synonymous 
with EU membership. Indeed, although ‘the share of Britain’s population comprising non-
Britons is not out of line with other EU countries’ (Tilford, 2016), Leave voters remain 
concerned about the proportion of ‘migrants’ residing in the UK. As Susan also articulates, her 
concerns around immigration were not only confined to people migrating from EU countries 
but also, around those migrating from outside of the EU. Although most interviewees 
demonstrated awareness that their Leave vote had little direct bearing on migration from 
outside of the EU, reflections on non-EU migration were nonetheless common. In this sense, 
Leave voters appeared to see the ‘Brexit’ vote as an opportunity to signal a general 
dissatisfaction with UK immigration policy. For many then, the vote had the potential to directly 
influence migration from the EU but also to indirectly – or symbolically – send a message of 
intolerance to non-EU ‘migrants’, whom Susan ‘certainly’ does not want to migrate to the UK. 
The additional emphasis Susan employs here is thus demonstrative of a hierarchy of 
migration, in which non-EU ‘migrants’ are even less welcome than their EU counterparts. 
 
This message of intolerance was often coupled with a feeling of resentment that the EU and 
its bureaucrats were able to hold some sort of power and authority over the British people. As 
Katherine stated  
I voted Brexit on the sole reason of immigration, to keep control of our borders… 
secondary to that, Britain is a proud nation and it always has been, and I couldn't, 
not for the life of me, understand how some bureaucrats in Brussels could tell the 
British people what they could and what they couldn't do. 
In keeping with Virdee and McGreever’s (2018) findings that the Leave vote signalled a desire 
to reinstate the sovereign will of British people, narratives like Katherine’s not only illustrate 
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patriotic sentiments about Britain as a ‘proud nation’ but also, demonstrate an attempt to re-
position Britain as a great power. Perhaps implicit within her reflections, therefore, is a harking 
back to a state similar to (albeit an already always sanitised version of) that seen during British 
colonialism and Empire building. The nostalgia for such a period not only shapes future goals 
but fails to recognise that Britain’s colonial and Empire building practices were profoundly 
exploitative and violent. Indeed ‘post-racial’ hegemony is dependent upon white historical 
amnesia (Joseph-Salisbury, 2018b) or what Stuart Hall (1978: 26) describes as a ‘profound 
historical forgetfulness… about race and Empire since the 1950s.’ This denial of Britain’s long 
history of racism and white supremacy is coupled with a longing for Empire: a ‘postcolonial 
melancholia’ that not only nostalgically wishes for a return to imperialist times but also, 
endorses the neo-colonialism of the present (Gilroy, 2004). The narratives of Leave voters 
thus revealed a feeling that departure from the EU would help Britain to regain its power, or at 
least to ‘take back control’ of its own future. 
 
A distance from racism 
In the same way as Susan above sought to ‘not sound racist’, many interviewees distanced 
themselves from accusations of racism when reflecting on their motivations for voting Leave. 
They expressed disappointment, and at times anger, about how they perceived they have 
been constructed in populist discourse and by Remain voters as un(der)educated racists. This 
was particularly notable in Katherine’s account 
I mean I've got a degree and two postgraduate degrees. There's this sweeping 
generalisation that we're thick, ignorant, racist, stupid, like I said, we hate 
foreigners, and it's all completely wrong…I’m in the public sector… there's these 
massive tenders worth millions of pounds and because it's so fair, they are often 
awarded to companies that reside outside of the UK and I'm thinking we should be 
protecting our British-based workers and their jobs.  
Katherine felt the need to highlight her educational qualifications and her employment in the 
public sector, in an attempt to expose the inaccuracies of the essentialising narratives that 
have emerged around ‘Brexit’ voters. She is not the ‘left behind’ Leave voter that is 
hegemonically constructed in early analyses of ‘Brexit’. Instead, Katherine uses the 
‘unfairness’ she sees through her employment to legitimise, or mitigate, her racialised views. 
She is not ‘thick, ignorant, racist’ or ‘stupid’ but rather, wants to protect ‘British-based workers.’ 
In so doing, Katherine presents racism in a ‘post-race’ era, as something only associated with 
un(der)-educated and un(der)-employed individuals, rather than being a pervasive and 
pernicious feature of our social, economic and political structures. Like the white working-class 
participants in McKenzie’s (2017: 205-207) research, who ‘were confused and hurt’ by the 
portrayal of them in the media as ‘backwards and ‘racists’, it is clear too that Katherine felt the 
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need pre-empt and challenge accusations of racism and xenophobia, by highlighting her 
educational and employment status. As McKinney (2003: 44) contends, whiteness is often 
constructed by white people as susceptible to ‘cultural victimisation’, in that they perceive 
themselves to encounter unfair charges of racism. For many white people, being labelled a 
racist is ‘the ultimate insult’ (Tatum, 1997), as Katherine articulates. Indeed, in a ‘post-racial’ 
context, racisms persist whilst attempts to ‘identify, comprehend or condemn’ them are 
invalidated (Goldberg, 2015: 82) and are themselves often reframed as a form of racism 
(Joseph-Salisbury, 2018b). 
 
Other interviewees sought to distance themselves from accusations of racism by pointing to 
their relationships with racially minoritised people. As Patrick noted 
I know there are people on the hard left who like to say that Brexiteers are all 
knuckle-dragging racists and that's far from being the case. Certainly, there are 
some people who fall into that category who are in the Leave camp, but I was 
married to a Black African lady. My children are mixed-race.  
Like, Katherine above, Patrick attempts to connect racism with un(der)educated and poorly 
socialised individuals: the ‘knuckle-dragging’ members of the population. In doing so, he too 
employs a narrow definition of racism and a narrow construction of racists, which fails to 
understand racism’s structural and institutional nature. In addition though, by demonstrating 
his close proximity to racially minoritised people, Patrick sought to dispel the notion that he, 
and other Leave voters, are racist. This can be understood as an attempt to avoid the stigma 
associated with the label of ‘racist’ in a ‘post-racial’ society that has – or so the argument goes 
– embraced diversity and achieved racial equity. Patrick’s assertion that he ‘was married to a 
Black African lady’ may be viewed as a form of tokenism-by-association and a variant on the 
popular refrain ‘some of my friends are Black’, which is commonly employed by white people 
when confronted with charges of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). Yet research suggests that 
some white people engage in ‘enlightened exceptionalism’ (Wise, 2009): that is, a form of 
racism in which some racially minoritised people are held as exceptional to the ‘norm’. In this 
sense, it is possible for white people to exhibit racist attitudes, whilst simultaneously having 
close relationships to those racialised as ‘Other’. 
 
Although Patrick above emphasised his close proximity to a Black woman through marriage, 
the relationships of other interviewees to racially minoritised and/or migrating people were 
more tenuous. Christopher, for example, claimed 
I’ve never been a racist, I’ve lived and worked in South Africa. I’ve lived and worked 
with all kinds of different ethnic groups, got on with all of them famously, but I’m 
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turning racist more and more now, because we seem to be getting the fatter end 
of the deal, which is a shame really.  
Here, Christopher seeks to evidence his claim that he’s ‘never been a racist’ by underlining 
that he gets on ‘famously’ with people of different ethnic groups. This, according to Bonilla-
Silva (2018), is a common practice amongst white people, who may exaggerate the strength 
of their relationships with racially minoritised people in an attempt to present themselves as 
racially tolerant. Yet what are often missing in their accounts are tangible displays of trust and 
friendship. In this sense, Bonilla-Silva (2018) suggests that these relationships are somewhat 
superficial, instrumental and short-lived. What is also noteworthy in Christopher’s reflection is 
the claim that although he had ‘never been a racist’, he is ‘turning racist more and more’. This 
may be understood as an attempt by Christopher to position his ‘racism’ as justifiable: racism 
is not inherent within him but rather, it has come about for ‘legitimate’ reasons and because of 
external factors. His racism was not present, he claims, until his ‘deal’ in life was threatened. 
This may be viewed in the context of widespread attempts of late to change and/or inflate the 
definition of racism in order to legitimise it, which is perhaps only possible because racism is 
said to no longer exist in a ‘post-racial’ society (Joseph-Salisbury, 2018a). Whilst Kauffman 
(2017) argues that we ought to accept that all groups look after their own racial self-interests 
and thus should not conflate the racial self-interests of the white majority with racism, what he 
fails to recognise is that ‘minority partiality’ occurs in the context of a white supremacist power 
structure (Bhambra, 2017). Thus, when racially minoritised groups seek to exert racial self-
interest, it is to redress racial inequality, whereas white majority racial self-interest operates to 
maintain the status quo. Put another way, Christopher’s racism can thus be understood to 
emerge once his ‘white privilege’ (McIntosh, 1988) is threatened. In the next section, we 
unpack this notion of ‘white privilege’ some more. 
 
Reverse discrimination versus white privilege  
It was clear that interviewees did not perceive there to be benefit deriving from their whiteness 
but conversely, many suggested that they felt victimised or marginalised as a white Salfordian. 
Nowhere was this more evident than in the account of Greg, who claimed 
I do honestly feel as a white person, a white Salfordian for want of a better word, 
marginalised. I do feel that as a white male. I do feel marginalised as a white male 
because I feel that all the world’s ills are turned around on me. Certainly, in this 
political climate…I’m a potential racist.  
Here, Greg reflects on his positionality to suggest that rather than accruing privilege by virtue 
of being racialised and gendered as a white man, he in fact feels blamed for ‘all the world’s 
ills’. Whilst Greg clearly feels stigmatised as a ‘potential racist’, his reflections should be 
understood within a context in which the white working-class are often reluctant to accept their 
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white privilege, particularly in a society assumed to be ‘post-racial’: beyond ‘race’. Yet it is 
perhaps because of the intersectional nature of oppression (Hill Collins and Bilge, 2016) that 
Greg fails to recognise his privilege. Indeed, when struggling against class-based oppression, 
it is difficult to see racialised and gendered hierarchies of privilege. Austerity, as Virdee and 
McGreever (2018) contend, has exacerbated existing class-based inequalities, causing very 
real suffering amongst the working-classes. Across the political spectrum, it is the ‘white 
working-class’ who have been constructed as the foremost losers of globalisation, a notion 
that reflects, and reaffirms, the long-term absence of a multi-ethnic working-class frame. The 
real injuries of class have thus become recast through the politics of racist resentment, with 
racially minoritised and ‘migrant’ bodies positioned as a threat to the socio-economic survival 
of the ‘white working-class.’  
 
Not only does Greg appear to reject his racialised and gendered privilege but he implies that 
he in fact experiences a form of ‘reverse discrimination’, in that he feels the ill-effects of being 
a white man (Pincus, 2003). The argument goes that racially minoritised people have 
benefitted so greatly through equality policies in ‘post-racial’ times, that it is the ‘indigenous’ 
white population that is now being discriminated against (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). Such racially-
defined identity politics featured heavily not only in Leave voters’ defence of racism but also, 
in the processes through which they set themselves apart from the racialised ‘Other.’ For these 
interviewees, the perceived fixed (raced) and quasi-fixed (Salfordian/British) aspects of their 
identity, were considered, above all else, to be fundamentally important. Perceiving his ‘white 
Salfordian’ identity to be threated, Greg (re)positions whiteness not as a form of privilege but 
as a victimised identity. This discourse is not unique to Greg but rather, growing numbers of 
white people are claiming to be racially oppressed in Western society (Hughey, 2014), with 
discourses around ‘reverse racism’ as well as ‘reverse sexism’ gaining traction. This is despite 
the scholarly work of anti-racist and/or feminist theorists drawing attention to how racialised 
and gendered domination is forged in historical processes (Hill Collins and Bilge, 2016; 
Leonardo, 2004). 
 
Although interviewees did not explicitly acknowledge their ‘white privilege’, its existence was 
nonetheless implicit in their accounts. When asked to consider the impact ‘Brexit’ may have 
upon their local area and British society as a whole, few interviewees recognised the potential 
for any negative implications. Stuart, for example, claimed 
I don’t think it will affect the normal people like us whether they leave or whether 
they stay. It will just carry on, you do exactly the same thing, don’t you? 
Like most other interviewees, Stuart perceived that the Referendum outcome had not, and 
that Britain’s exit from the EU would not, have any effect on ‘normal people’ like him. His 
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deployment of the term ‘normal people’ is an interesting one and may be understood as an 
attempt to set apart those racialised as white or constructed as native ‘British/English’ from 
those who have thus far experienced the greatest repercussions from the Referendum 
outcome: those racialised as ‘Other’ and/or people who migrate. Only one interviewee noted 
the growth in reported hate crime since the Referendum (Devine, 2018) and the apparent 
emboldening of far-Right groups such as the Football Lad’s Alliance and Britain First. That the 
Referendum was constructed by interviewees as having little or no effect on their everyday 
lives, freedoms and rights, can be understood as demonstrative of their racialised (and 
intersectional) privileges. Indeed, levels of concerns are likely to be far higher amongst people 
constructed as ‘migrant’, as well as the majority of the Black and Asian electorate in the UK – 
approximately three-quarters and three-thirds of which voted Remain, respectively (Khan, 
2017). It is perhaps by virtue of an imagined ‘post-racial’ society, that white Leave voters are 
able to remain ignorant of the racialised consequences of ‘Brexit’.  
 
Salford Leave voters’ seeming ignorance to the xeno-racism both underpinning and 
legitimised by the Referendum was also present in their reflections on the positive impacts 
‘Brexit’ might bring for people who migrate. Jonathan, for example, noted that although he 
harboured some guilt about voting in a way that may restrict the free movement of people, he 
believed it will assist (would-be) ‘migrants’ in the longer-term 
Part of me does feel quite bad about that but I think in the long run it'll be better for 
those people themselves because I think that the EU doesn't do their countries any 
favours…It might give them the right to work somewhere else but, actually, why 
have their countries been so impoverished that they have to travel thousands of 
miles to come and work somewhere else? 
Since Jonathan understands EU countries not to do themselves ‘any favours’, he suggests 
that Britain should, in effect, act on their behalf. Although he acknowledges that restrictive 
immigration policy will negatively impact people seeking to migrate for work in the short-term, 
he suggests it is in their best interests to remain in their countries of origin. Thus, his argument 
goes that taking away the option of migration can operate as a means of ‘helping’ other EU 
countries to prosper. This may be read as a form of paternalism, one that is reminiscent of 
colonial ‘civilising missions’ and the ‘white saviour’ mentality that underpinned them. By 
recasting other EU member states as ‘impoverished’, Jonathan positions himself as a hero for 
the social cause, disguising (white) self-interest behind the façade of protectionism. Virdee 
and McGreever (2018: 1805) are therefore quite right to point to how ‘Brexit’ drew on ‘deep 
reservoirs of imperial longing’ that yearned for Britain’s regaining of social, economic and 
political superiority, whilst simultaneously erasing the racist underpinnings of Empire. ‘Brexit’ 
can therefore be understood to legitimises the UK to act as a ‘powerful vector’ for the 
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imposition of its ‘ideas and mode of behaviour’ upon countries deemed to be less advanced 
(Donini, 2010: 226). In this way, the UK can pretend to moral superiority, whilst engaging in a 
soft form of imperialism: one that does not attract the same visceral condemnation as 
colonialism – which of course, is unpalatable in a ‘post-racial’ epoch – but remains nonetheless 
intrusive in the affairs of other countries. 
 
The role that the UK occupies in regulating the behaviours of other countries was also 
observed by Jane, who noted that it plays an important function in overseeing the ‘policing’ of 
world affairs 
Like in the days of the British Empire, you remember those old maps where the 
map of the world and which, the country and the Queen and the Head and it's like 
nobody wants that, we're never going to be that powerful role again on the world 
scale. On the other hand, I feel quite proud that we're almost, we're one of the 
world's policemen. If something bad is going on somewhere in the world, we'll 
always stick our heads up and say something about it.  
Clearly cognizant of the unpalatability of a melancholic longing for Empire in ‘post-racial’ times, 
Jane emphasises that ‘nobody wants’ the return of the British Empire. Yet she remains ‘quite 
proud’ of Britain’s operation as ‘the ‘world’s policemen’, a construction popularised under 
Empire. In this sense, she draws upon a nostalgic view of Empire and its continued influence 
on the mind-set of those white supremacy has benefitted the most. As Gilroy (2005: 434-437) 
notes, the construction of Britishness in these ways is problematic given that it is shaped by 
Britain’s biased understanding of its own colonial history, where Britishness is viewed through 
an ‘airbrushed’ and ‘nostalgic filter’. It ‘feeds the illusion that Britain has been or can be 
disconnected from its imperial past’ (Gilroy, 2004: 2) and in this sense, ‘postcolonial 
melancholia’ is central to a ‘post-racial’ society in which ‘race’ is assumed not to be a key 
defining principle. For Jane, like other interviewees, ‘Brexit’ thus offers an opportunity, not for 
the return of Empire in the concrete sense, but for the re-imagination of Britain as a 
contemporary authority figure in a symbolic sense. Indeed, whilst maintaining that ‘race’ no 
longer matters and that racism is a thing of the past, Leave voters are able to re-formulate the 
explicitly white supremacist practices of Empire as something acceptable in ‘post-racial’ times.  
 
Conclusion 
Foregrounding data generated through 13 semi-structured interviews as part of a broader 
mixed-methods project, this article has examined the presence and power of ‘post-racial’ 
racisms in Salford Leave voters’ reflections on the motivations behind their vote. Whilst 
previous research has focused on the individual and area-level drivers behind the ‘Brexit’ vote 
– and much of this has found that concerns over immigration were a central motivator – little 
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social scientific research has to date examined the subtle and seemingly non-racial ways in 
which xeno-racialised narratives underpin the accounts of Leave voters. Instead, early 
analyses have offered a one-dimensional and class-centric focus on the ‘left behind’, a 
narrative that has gained much political purchase. In this article, we therefore offer a counter-
narrative to the ‘left behind’ motif by demonstrating the ways in which our white working-class 
and middle-class interviews expressed views that were, in various ways and to different 
degrees, ‘xeno-racist’ in the ‘post-racial’ sense. That is to say, interviewees took great care to 
put forward seemingly non-racial accounts of their vote by employing economic arguments 
and emphasising their proximity to racially minoritised and/or migrating people, in an attempt 
to disguise or mitigate their racist views. In this sense, their concerns about the negative 
impact of ‘uncontrolled’ immigration on the white ‘indigenous’ population were framed a 
‘legitimate’ response to a victimised whiteness. 
 
Rather than living in the ‘post-racial’ epoch many imagine, this article demonstrates that racism 
continues to thrive through new modes of articulation (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). These ‘everyday’ 
and ‘new racisms’ (Fekete, 2001; Kundnani, 2001; Sivanadan 2006) emerge from the 
shadows at key times, such as the EU Referendum, and re-fashion themselves in ways that 
are considered more palatable than the older (explicit) racisms of past. Although the data 
presented here is specific to the Salford context, it casts light on the way in which new racisms 
are engrained with the social, political and economic structures of the UK, and Western 
societies more broadly. It was not our intention to demonise Leave voters in this article but 
rather, to reflect upon these structures and how they give rise to ‘post-racial’ racist narratives. 
Thus, to properly understand the Leave vote, it is imperative that we recognise how post-
colonial anxieties and a yearning for Empire-like conditions operate behind the façade of the 
‘post-racial’. In the context of ‘Brexit’, we must recognise that concerns around identity, place 
and citizenship are highly-racialised through structures that enable white normativity to go 
unchallenged and which obfuscate the centrality of racism in contemporary Britain.  
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i The Mobile Research Laboratory is a vehicle available to researchers at the University of 
Salford to conduct fieldwork in situ. It was employed by the researchers in this study to take 
the ‘research out’ into the local area, by distributing information about the research with the 
aim of encouraging Salford Leave voters to enter the Laboratory to complete the online survey 
and/or participate in a semi-structured interview. This approach was adopted on one occasion 
for a total of 5 hours. 
ii Pseudonyms have been used to adhere to data protection requirements. 
                                                          
